WHAT WE KNOW(SALT report) – Size. An armed individual, self-proclaimed as an ISIS-affiliated operative, wearing a military fatigue, driving a rented pick-up truck packed with explosives (meant to be a VBIED[1]).
Activity. Individual complex attack by means of a) intentional vehicle grinding against a number of unidentified individuals walking on a pedestrian street; b) shooting at bystanders and first responders on the scene; c) detonating the VBIED (not executed); d) detonating at least 2 other IED (not executed).
Location. Bourbon Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, US.
Time. January 1st, 2025 since 03:15am.
As a consequence of the attack:
Battle damage. Mass casualty event with 15 fatalities (attacker included) and 35 injured. Additional material damages.
Effects. Global outreach of the event (specifically triggered by an ISIS-styled black flag mounted on the SUV); temporary paralysis of the city due to the critical incident and its management; widespread man-hunting activity against possible acolytes (not confirmed yet).
WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW
Two main unknowns – which are the information requirements pertaining to the enemy forces that need to get collected and analyzed – can be hitherto identified:
Informational. Why has ISIS not claimed the significant event in the info space yet (while the attacker posted a couple of videos on platforms just hours before the critical incident)?
Organizational. Can the significant event be identified as an isolated action or has it to be deemed as part of a larger plot still in the development phase to be carried out by a cell already deployed in the US?
WHAT WE THINK
The attack possesses the hallmarks of the terrorist enterprise as mainly perpetrated by ISIS. The employed operational process (PPE) can be traced as follows: planning (P) with site surveillance and target casing; preparation (P) with the procurement of vehicle, weapons and explosives and dissemination of videos on social media platforms; execution (E) of the complex attacks aimed at producing mass casualties.
The subsequent factors should be kept in mind when assessing the critical incident in order to flesh out measures to counter similar events:
Surveillance. Investigations have recently highlighted as the attacker executed the operational preparation of the environment by selecting the soft-target thru a probable CARVER[2]-like methodology. A likely Critical Vulnerability identified in the process could be the malfunction of the steel barricades at the entrance of Burbon Street, which has allowed the perpetrator to activate the operational chain of events.
Action on the objective. The TTP[3] refers to (individual) complex attack made up of the following stages: a) ramming people as a shaping operation (executed); b) shooting at bystanders and first responders in order to lure, fix and suppress (executed) and activating the VBIED with the goal of maximizing the effects of the explosion (not executed) as decisive operations; c) setting off previously placed IEDs in order to disrupt the critical incident management activity (not executed) as a supporting operation.
Strategic and psychological significance. These types of attacks – which are aimed at maximizing the casualties amongst the affected crowd – are PPEd with the goal of generating extensive media attention by amplifying the attackers’ storylines while instilling terror and uncertainty in the targeted societal fabrics, especially during events that possess distinctive traits of collective sentiment (like Christmas markets or New Year celebrations).
Open source affiliation. If we look closer at the significant event, there is nothing new here: as proclaimed already by the violent extremist strategist Abu Musab al-Suri back in the early 2000s, the operational principal “nizam la tandim” still applies. No structured organizational affiliations, which is more easily spottable; but practice inspired by guidance to be found in the “believe system”, which implies a more fluid, flattened and difficult to identify the sequence of events on the part of the (isolated) agent. The affiliated, as in the case under scrutiny, is usually a self-radicalized lone actor with no training provided by ISIS or other terrorist-designated organizations. Moreover, the operational logistical procurement chain has to be executed on the spot (the targeted place), in that the activity will be hampering the execution of tracking activities by security services due to the lack of movements of operatives and material.
Urban warfare. Again, the critical incident underlines the more profitable operational environment that is currently being selected and exploited by ISIS-type terrorist structures. The effects (informational, psychological and operational wise) and costs (in terms of measures to be adopted) of attacks in urban settings that are endured by the target-society grandly outweigh the employment of resources – in terms of work force, costs and material to be used – on the part of the enemy forces. Reliable open source information recently disseminated refers to specific urban warfare type trainings currently being organized and implemented by terrorist structures in Afghanistan.
The operational deniability strategy. OSINF recently circulating in several social media platforms points out a marriage of opportunity that has been supposedly “celebrated” between the Islamic State Korasan (IS-K) and the Taliban (and the Haqqani Network – HQN) and “officiated” by the so-called al-Qaeda 2.0 (AQ) headed by Hamza bin Laden, the son of the late Osama. The mastermind of the affair, AQ, has been harnessing the operational reach and the expandable brand of IS-K in order to orchestrate blows against the enemies, under the auspices of and the shelter provided by the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (in some respect intertwined with the HQN), without the need of being exposed. The goal is to remain silent, in an arranged false-flag mode, so that the long term grand strategy that was left-over after the demise of Osama and Zawahiri can be re-ignite, re-organized and implemented in a more enhanced and current fashion.
[1] Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device, essentially a car bomb.
[2] The procedure is a structured Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment tool aimed at identifying Critical Vulnerabilities of a target based off the following criteria/indicators: Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability.
[3] Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.