2024 ends in the echo of the Magdeburg attack, a reminder of the gaps and weaknesses security agencies face when trying to combat terrorism. Earlier in December, the European Council acknowledged that “terrorism and violent extremism, as well as radicalisation, continue to pose a significant threat to the European Union and its Member States” and recognised how “destabilising internal and external events, such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, have heightened the terrorism threat level in some Member States and contributed to the intensification of radicalisation and social polarisation, potentially leading to terrorism and violent extremism across the Union”.
As we will soon enter 2025, certain key aspects of terrorism require critical understanding and consideration:
i. Radicalisation and polarisation continue to be highlighted by experts as pivotal in the phenomenon of extremist and terrorist violence. Both processes have to do with narratives communicated and adopted by members of society. Yet, it is a mistake to look only at the level of radicalisation directly connected to violence. This level regards only certain individuals recruited by groups to carry out attacks or take up violent activity on their own as lone actors, inspired by the rhetoric and propaganda they have believed in. While such involvement is of the utmost priority for authorities to detect and tackle, the radicalisation and polarisation of a broader segment of society is equally important. Such people may never themselves act violently but they legitimize violence and accept it as the right way to react, protest, and struggle are also important and need attention and monitoring. The societal acceptance (or even glorification) of terrorist violence serves as oxygen for its existence and continuation, and it can undermine official counterterrorism measures taken by governments.
The alarming narrative during 2024 concerned the subjectivity of terrorism as a concept and phenomenon. After 9/11 and other attacks of the Islamist network -especially in the West- for many years terrorism was perceived as an undeniable evil and threat, with terrorists portrayed as the bad guys endangering human lives and democratic institutions. The attack by Hamas against Israel in October 2023 gave a big blow to the common understanding of the term terrorism. For example, the 2017 Manchester Arena attack during a concert was never doubted to be a terror attack. In contrast, the 2023 Nova music festival attack in Israel was regarded by many people as “resistance” and legitimate reaction to Israeli policies. The perpetrators of the Manchester attack were reported to be motivated by the perceived injustice of Muslim children dying in bombings during the American-led intervention in the Syrian civil war[1]. This context (along with UK’s foreign policy legacy considered as having contributed to certain conflicts around the globe) did not affect the perception that attacking civilians, young people celebrating music constitutes terrorism. Although the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is a long-standing, complicated one, and Israel’s past counter-terrorism and foreign policies have created serious grievances in Palestinian society, this cannot change the textbook terrorist nature of the attack by Hamas on October 2023: multiple attacks, targeting civilians of various ages, including seniors and babies victimised and taken as hostages (even today the fate of many hostages remains unknown). The group during the first hours of its terrorist operation published images of women abused, taking pride in its accomplishments.
There is nothing worse than a subjective perspective when states try to combat terrorism. The fight against terrorism is not won solely through arrests, nor sending terrorists to prison. A brief look at the history of terrorism in many countries shows how convicted and even dead terrorists can become heroes, martyrs, and symbols of reference and inspiration for future generations who embrace and perpetuate violence. Terrorism has been referred to as “propaganda by the deed” and this propaganda is winning if its violence gets justified or tolerated by societies. A successful counter-terrorism campaign means absolute delegitimization and rejection of violence against civilians to carry out ideological, political, religious, whatever type of struggle and against whatever type of grievances created. After all, no state or government has an immaculate record. The moment people accept the notion that the end justifies the means, then terrorism is tolerated if not accepted (and with the same logic also counter-terrorism strategies that breach human rights are tolerated and accepted). Exactly such conditions give terrorists the oxygen and space they need to exist, creating a valuable pool of sympathisers and possibly future recruits as well.
Part of the subjective perception around the concepts of “terrorists” “resistance fighters”, “insurgents”, and “revolutionaries” is connected to the belief that the powerful are the ones who hypocritically label actions and groups according to their interests and agenda. E.g. Palestinian groups are presented as terrorist groups and what they do as terrorism, by Israel, the U.S., and other powerful states (usually of the West), because that is the way it suits them. The recent developments in Syria-unless the West is careful- could reinforce the above position. Assad was ruling with murders, torture, and persecution against those who were opposing him. While the collapse of Assad’s regime is good news, a serious question arises: Can Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (whose precursor was Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda[2]), once considered by Western countries as a terrorist organisation, be now accepted as a legitimate political entity and government of Syria? Is Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (who spent time even in Abu Ghraib[3]) a terrorist or not? Is he and his group “rebels”? Wasn’t his organisation responsible for massacres? Rebranding him and his group to build alliances under the new scheme of power has many implications. It could be used (rightly so) as an example of “fluidity”, relativity, and subjectivity when it comes to “labelling” terrorists, thus undermining the whole narrative counterterrorism and security policy has been built on the last two decades.
ii. After the recent attack in Magdeburg, a whole discussion has emerged about the ideology and the motivation of the perpetrator and how he was not detected on time by German authorities. Much information about Taleb al-Abdulmohsen seems conflicting, and many wonder what kind of terrorist attack this could be categorised as: It could not be an Islamist attack, because the perpetrator condemns publicly Islam, to the extent that past statements of his were characterised even as Islamophobic. It could also not be considered a far-right attack, since the perpetrator was a Saudi immigrant, clearly not fitting the stereotype usually associated with far-right violence (e.g. a “native”, “pure German” perpetrator). So, what kind of terrorism was this and why did the authorities not counter such terrorism appropriately? That very question based on the type of terrorism, could be the root of the problem and the weakness of the current security system (and not just of Germany). The Magdeburg case is a compelling example, of why we need to shift focus from definitions of terrorism based on reasons and motivations, as they do not work and sometimes, they can even confuse authorities[4]. There are often no credible signs to identify the “typical terrorist”, until it is too late, exactly like in the Magdeburg attack[5]. The various characteristics of the attacker are scrutinised now, after the deadly event, revealing a dangerous person for German security. This terrorist communicated his violent intentions online, but he just did not fit the profiles associated with the usual threats from the far-rigth and/or the Islamist network German Security prioritises. Al-Abdulmohsen’s attack is described as an example of “Salad Bar extremism lacking uniform and coherent ideology[6].
A novel approach is needed that abandons the ideological dimension as a founding dimension of terrorism and understanding that “an act of terrorism is such for the effects that this act generates, not for the causes that drove it”. This has a direct practical and operational implications. It indicates that risk assessment must evolve to become more effective. Risk assessment tools based on the wrong assumptions of continuity, linearity, and ideal coherence, miss what is called “Salad Bar Ideology” and can leave out those who are radicalised, but do not belong to one well-defined and standard ideology. There are though ways to try to address the “unexpected” terrorists of today, who act outside clear ideological lines. For example, the so-called “Digital Humint” approach, which analyses both the “real” and “virtual” dimensions together, exploring not only the network of offline relationships and habits but also the social media ecosystem and chat rooms, is such a way.
iii. The Magdeburg attack has provided another valuable lesson that has to do with adequately addressing terrorist threats. Since today mapping threats can be more challenging than ever due to all the factors mentioned earlier, it is crucial to invest in situational prevention measures, so that attackers are prevented from having operational access to their target. This requires successful risk assessment, identifying possible targets and then choosing the proper measures to keep terrorists at a distance. In Magdeburg, the biggest failure of authorities was this: they did not apply basic situational prevention measures. Even thinking with the old logic of “terrorist ideologies”, Christmas markets are an obvious target for Islamist terrorists and there was the precedent of the 2016 Berlin attack. Places where large crowds of people gather are standard targets for suicide attacks, but also “hit and run” attacks with knives or vehicles. They are also selected as a target by lone actors. Thus, there were all the reasons present for German authorities- even if they had no intelligence on the Magdeburg attacker- to ensure that no vehicle ramming attack would take place. Police patrols did not react promptly, and the barrier system failed. Various types of barriers[7] without gaps[8] should have been employed so that neither attacking, nor of course leaving the crime scene would be possible. The perpetrator used the emergency lanes, which raises the public’s concern whether the attack could have been prevented. Both safety and security could be reached with moveable barriers that would not leave gaps, but they could be repositioned in case of an emergency, e.g. If ambulances needed to pass, or crowds had to evacuate more easily the area.
According to the late terrorism expert David Rapoport and his four waves of terrorism theory[9] 2025 should be seen as the year the religious wave of terrorism fades away. But maybe the way terrorism has evolved resembles a churning sea, with many overlapping waves. Religious terrorism may not be anymore what it was in 2001 when al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 attack or when years later Daesh sought to establish its caliphate and at the same time attacked Europe. But it is still present. The “Salad Bar Ideology” could very well be the wave, offering forms of religious ideological inspiration to those who need such an alibi for their violence. What is imperative to understand during 2025 is that combatting terrorism cannot be done like in the past. The ideological fusion observed in terrorism has repercussions that significantly affect counterterrorism policies. Some steps that need to be taken include focusing on the terrorist act instead of the ideology (which sometimes even the perpetrator may be so sure of) and investing in mapping possible threats as well as assessing the risk of possible operational types of attacks. These are needed to implement adequate protective measures. Finally, societies need to position themselves firmly against terrorism. Whatever measures security agencies take, if “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is accepted as a perspective, the battle against terrorism is already lost.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation.
[2] For background info on the group, and their rebranding as “rebels”, see https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce313jn453zo and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q0w1g8zqvo.
[3] https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2024/12/08/from-riyadh-to-rebellion-rise-of-syrias-abu-mohammad-al-golani/.
[4] The critical comments and suggestions of this part are included in the article titled “Terrorism has evolved, but are we keeping up?” by Marco Lombardi, based on the presentation at the conference of the Regional Anti Terrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (4-5 September 2024), where the author was invited as an expert, https://360info.org/terrorism-has-evolved-but-are-we-keeping-up/.
[5] German police described the perpetrator as “atypical”, https://www.dw.com/en/security-questions-over-christmas-market-attack-in-magdeburg/a-71138203
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/24/germany-magdeburg-christmas-market-attacker-what-we-know-so-far.
[7] For more on measures to secure public spaces from terrorist attacks, see https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC131172/JRC131172_01.pdf
[8] There were large concrete blocks in Magdeburg Christmas market, yet the perpetrator took advantage of the gap between them large enough to allow emergency vehicles to pass through, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y4q4eny2do.
[9] See David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 46-73.